With the Taliban emirate restored, a growing militant reorganisation is underway in Afghanistan, compounded by simmering ethnic tensions, a paralysed economy and expanding narcotics production. Amid this, the Taliban has instituted a “Taliban First” policy— claiming war spoils with a vengeance, using repression as a compliance tool, and quashing all representative values. With no regional consensus on the way forward, the mixed dangers of Afghanistan morphing into another Somalia or breaking into a loose confederacy of statelets such as the former Yugoslavia or becoming the next drug-replete Medellin is not a distant possibility.
The Taliban appears unserious about the dangerous future that Afghanistan faces. Taliban rulers are driven primarily by their desire to rule, in their own absolute terms, an ideological apartheid State. They are using the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe as a ransom-seeking bargaining tactic for international engagement, diplomatic recognition, and financial support. But inside Afghanistan, they are exploiting their martial exploits to enrich themselves, including customs revenues, seizure of personal houses and properties. With the personal coffers of Taliban rulers replete with cash, drug smuggling and narco-financing serve as a force multiplier and a mainstay for various Taliban groups.
Moreover, the Taliban takeover has inflamed serious ethnic tensions rather than bridging them. Taliban, trusting only those who look like them, has violently gone after those seeking to establish opposition or alternative power centres. Meanwhile, the fervour for suicidal jihadism remains prevalent within Taliban ranks. Disparate Taliban factions still play a silent role with their foreign terror partners such as al-Qaeda. Taliban leaders publicly glorify suicide bombers and martyrdom, for which they need an enemy.
Make no mistake, it is important to maintain constructive pragmatism to deal with the regime. The challenge is that the Taliban operates on the assumption that no Western leverage is so strong that it becomes permanent. That’s why the recent UN committee’s decision to not allow the Taliban to represent Afghanistan in the world body sends the right message.
Despite the aura of America’s failure in Afghanistan, the United States (US) is in a better position to deal with the Taliban. But as it defines the new Afghan chapter, any interim Taliban engagement should be tactical and pursued on two tracks: An urgent humanitarian response and an intelligence-led effort on counterterrorism and political relations.
Because the US exit has also prompted a new chapter for militant groups, there is a clear danger of hardline Taliban elements reorganising, negotiating new partnerships, and floating between groups such ISIS-K and al-Qaeda for transactional and ideological reasons. Hence, not only should Washington publicly clarify its rules of engagement, but it should also make frequent use of its sanctions tools, avoid over-reliance on non-kinetic approaches and unenforced red lines. If placing a US counterterrorism team inside Afghanistan is not achievable, it should negotiate placing a terrorism monitoring team on the ground. Meanwhile, Washington must avoid temptations to outsource or subcontract its counterterrorism efforts to Pakistan. Doing so would only create another crippling dependency on Pakistan.
For now, the Taliban seems to need time to recalculate and creatively readjust its approach. This winter, it will boost its “Taliban First” efforts to bring changes in internal structures to purify and solidify control over the ranks. Efforts to leash renegade elements will increase to control the frenzy among the warring factions, some possibly through assassinations. Despite little visibility into the inner workings of the regime, there is a clever division of responsibility among select Taliban leaders with important decisions made through a secret shura.
Similarly, the region also needs time to reassess positions and realign partnerships. Because the Taliban cannot run a non-ideological State, the region will likely engage in a broader effort to pressure Taliban rulers into adopting a pragmatic “hybrid ideology” instead of pursuing a singular identity.
While no country enjoys the kind of cosy relationship with the Taliban’s regime as Pakistan and Qatar do, most regional countries appear widely uncomfortable with Pakistan’s leading role in Afghanistan.
While the Taliban is likely to adopt a diversified approach in foreign relations, more Taliban “pragmatist” leaders will begin to view Qatar as a Big Brother. With Qatar now representing American interests in Afghanistan, more regional countries will instrumentalise their own ties with Doha. For instance, despite Turkey’s close ties with Pakistan, there is a growing Turkey-Qatar understanding about inclusivity and commercial engagements in Afghanistan.
For Iran, the Taliban problem is a complex issue — Tehran does not trust it, nor can it afford to ignore it. With the Afghanistan portfolio now managed by IRGC, Iran increasingly sees the indirect Taliban threat as a function of Tehran’s relationship with Washington. In other words, while Iran will closely coordinate with Qatar besides engaging directly with the Taliban, Tehran’s policy vis-à-vis the Taliban will ultimately depend on how the Taliban’s own relationship with Washington evolves.
India will be best placed to leverage its strong relationship with Qatar and UAE and align with Washington’s position to protect its broader interests. Such realignments away from Pakistan will surely trigger another layer of regional competition, including between Qatar and Pakistan, which effectively considers Afghanistan as an extended Pakistan.
For now, beyond the “Taliban First” policy, progress with the Taliban should be measured in inches, not miles. It will increase calls to delist Taliban leaders from sanctions lists and release the drug kingpin Bashir Noorzai from US custody in return for American hostages. The US should not unilaterally concede —including on the frozen Afghan reserves —which the Taliban see as war spoils. While some funds will eventually be released, the region should push the businessmen Taliban, especially Haqqani Network, to dig into their own criminal fortunes to support their administration.
Javid Ahmad is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and was Afghanistan’s ambassador to the UAE, 2020-2021
The views expressed are personal
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